How higher coal prices support gas hub prices

European gas demand fell by approximately 20% over the first five years of this decade.  But 2016 marked a turning point, with demand (including Turkey) rising by 27 bcma (or 5.4%).  Of this increase approximately 75% (or 20 bcma) was driven by higher power sector demand.

The switching of coal plants for CCGTs was the key driver behind the demand increase. More than 40% of incremental gas demand in 2016 came from the UK (where the gap between coal and gas marginal costs is narrower than the continent due to the carbon price floor).

What is perhaps surprising is that this increase in power sector gas demand was not the result of falling gas prices.  Spot prices at European hubs rose significantly across the second half of 2016. So how is this consistent with a shift to gas-fired power plants?

Linkage between coal and gas prices

It is the relative level of gas vs coal prices rather than absolute gas price levels that drives gas for coal switching in the power sector. Gas prices rose as 2016 progressed, but the proportional rise in coal prices was greater.

Chart 1 shows power sector demand curves for two different levels of coal price:

  1. 45 $/tonne: the Calendar 2016 forward price at the end of 2015
  2. 60 $/tonne: the approximate average outturn spot price across 2016

Chart 1 2016 European power sector gas demand curves

Source: Timera Energy

The two blue lines in the chart can be thought of as an aggregate gas demand curves for the European power sector.  In other words the lines show aggregate gas burn (bcma) as a function of gas price, for a given coal price level (45 and 60 $/t). We generate these demand curves by running multiple combinations of gas and coal prices through the pan-European power market model.

The chart shows a move to the right in the European aggregate demand curve as a result of the 2016 rise in coal prices.  As a result of this demand curve shift:

  1. Outturn gas hub prices in 2016 rose approximately 0.25 $/mmbtu relative to the Calendar 2016 forward price level at the end of 2015
  2. Power sector gas demand increased by 20 bcma from 2015 levels

The chart also provides an indication of what would have happened if coal prices had remained at 45 $/tonne in 2016.  Under this weaker coal price scenario, European gas hub prices would have had to have fallen by over 1.0 $/mmbtu to have allowed the European power sector to generate an equivalent 20 bcma increase in demand.  In other words the fact that coal prices roughly doubled between Q1 and Q4 2016 was a big factor supporting hub prices.

As the LNG glut grows, power sector switching will be a key mechanism allowing surplus LNG volumes to be absorbed by European hubs.   It is worth watching coal prices and power sector demand closely in 2017 as a driver of both European hub prices and spot LNG prices.

Article written by David Stokes & Olly Spinks

Evolving trends in LNG contracting

Several structural trends are combining to change the way that LNG is being contracted.  The traditional LNG contracting model was built on long term, destination specific, oil-indexed contracts between producers and suppliers.  But a surplus of gas from the current supply glut is boosting the negotiation power of LNG buyers, who are seeking greater volume and pricing flexibility.

The LNG contracting market is maturing with a growing role of intermediary players and emerging market buyers.  In parallel, there is a growing importance of hub market price signals as a benchmark from which to contract LNG.  These trends point towards the evolution of a new contracting model to support the next wave of global LNG supply.

In this week’s article we look at 4 key trends that are driving an evolution of LNG contracting behaviour.

1. Reduction in average contract length

The financing of new LNG supply projects has traditionally been underpinned by long term, oil-indexed contracts (the most recent exampe of which is the Australian export contracts signed in the first half of this decade).

But this model is becoming increasingly challenging for LNG buyers who are confronted by a growing penetration of hub pricing.  This is the same issue facing buyers of long term pipeline contracts. Mismatches between long term contract prices and hub prices are increasingly difficult to pass through to customers or to absorb into supplier portfolios.

The supply glut has taken the pressure off LNG buyers to secure new supply via traditional long term contracts.  Buyers in Asia, Europe and Latin America are instead pushing for shorter and more flexible gas linked contracts.  This has driven a reduction in average contract length since the glut took hold in 2014.  This can be seen in the left hand panel of Chart 1, taken from Shell’s 2017 LNG Outlook.

Chart 1: Empirical evidence of LNG contracting trends

Source: Shell

While the shift in contract negotiation power towards LNG buyers is an important factor behind reduced contract length, this trend is also supported by the other trends we set out below.

 2. Growing importance of portfolio players

The role of LNG ‘intermediaries’ has grown rapidly over the last five years. These are primarily commodity trading companies (e.g. Vitol, Gunvor, Trafigura) who are focused on LNG midstream flexibility, with portfolios built around shorter term contract positions and access to shipping, regas and storage capacity. The growing role of these intermediaries is driving an important erosion of the direct contracting of LNG between producers and end suppliers.

Supply glut conditions are helping intermediaries gain traction in the LNG contracting market. Oversupply increases the availability of cargoes to trade, as well as strengthening the role of hub price signals against which portfolios can be managed. Access to flexibility is key to the business and contracting models of intermediary players.  And that flexibility is being priced, hedged and optimised based on liquid hub price signals.

An example of the growing role of intermediaries was the large Egyptian tender in Nov 2016 (96 cargoes).  The tender was dominated by intermediary players, with Glencore winning the largest volume, Trafigura also securing cargoes and Vitol and Gunvor providing competition.

3. Declining buyer credit quality

The right hand panel of Chart 1 shows a pronounced decline in the credit ratings of LNG buyers.  This is a function of the evolving nature of LNG buyers.  Traditional A-rated buyers (e.g. Japan, Korea) are currently relatively well contracted from long term deals signed pre-glut. In contrast, stronger demand growth from emerging buyers (e.g. India, Egypt, Pakistan) is acting to reduce credit quality.

Higher buyer credit risk is also a factor contributing to shorter contract lengths.  Credit quality precludes a number of emerging buyers from contracting on a longer term basis.  This has for example been an issue that has led Argentina to buy LNG via shorter term tenders.

Credit risk is further supporting the role of intermediaries in the LNG market.  Commodity trading companies can often price & manage credit risk on a more competitive basis than producers, increasing their competitiveness in supplying LNG buyers.  Some intermediaries also provide a ‘sleeving’ service for sale of individual cargoes, to insulate producers from the credit risk of emerging buyers.

4. Increasing penetration of hub prices

Hub prices drive pricing of end user gas sales in Europe and North America.  As a result, there is a strong buyer preference for hub indexed LNG contracts.

So far there is an absence of liquid regional hubs as a reference in Asia and Latin America, although Singapore is making progress.  But in a world of converged global gas prices, there is growing confidence in Atlantic basin spot price signals (NBP, TTF, Henry Hub) as a global benchmark for LNG contracting.

Even when LNG is contracted on an oil-indexed basis, the contract pricing terms are being set off liquid hub price benchmarks.  Recent Middle Eastern tenders (e.g. Eygpt, Jordan) have been conducted on a Brent indexed basis, but with the level of oil-indexation effectively set off NBP & TTF spot price levels, given it is these hub prices driving the value of incremental LNG supply.

The importance of spot prices in the LNG market is penetrating much deeper than the exchange of contracts.  Volumes of LNG cargoes transacted on a spot basis are still relatively low.  But spot price signals are the key driver of LNG flow and optimisation decisions for large portfolio players, e.g. internal portfolio decisions such as cargo diversions and cargo swaps.

These portfolio optimisation activities impact a much larger volume of LNG than the external trading of cargoes.  The importance of spot price signals is set to grow further as 89 bcma [65 mtpa] of highly flexible new US export supply is due online by 2021, most in 2018/19.

LNG buyers gaining influence over contract terms

In the tight post Fukushima LNG market, large buyers were pursuing individual strategies in competing to contract available incremental supply from producers in the US and Australia.  But the supply glut has led to a more considered and collabrative approach.

Korean Kogas, Japanese JERA and China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) signed a memorandum of understanding this month to cooperate in the joint procurement of LNG.  While this collaboration is no doubt aimed at sourcing lower priced LNG, Asian buyers are also pushing for greater flexibility in contract pricing and volume terms.

Market conditions favour the buyers.  Our analysis shows the LNG market balance swinging relatively quickly from glut conditions to a tight market in the first half of next decade.  This leaves producers in a challenging position, given 5 year lead times on new liquefaction projects.

The supply glut means that current market price signals are being driven by SRMC dynamics. So it is unlikely that LNG buyers will sign up to long term oil-indexed supply contracts at prices that support liquefaction project LRMC.

The negotiating power of LNG buyers will likely force greater market risk and contracting concessions onto producers (and the equity capital supporting new liquefaction projects).  As the market tightens bargaining power will shift back towards producers.  But by this stage, the traditional long term oil-indexed contracting model for new supply may be in terminal decline.

Article written by Olly Spinks & David Stokes

Power sector switching, gas hub prices & volatility

In early 2016, the idea of a significant recovery in CCGT load factors at the expense of coal plants was treated with a degree of scepticism. CCGT load factors had been in decline for 5 years, driven by a combination of weak coal prices and increasing renewable output. Market consensus was firmly of the view that these trends would continue.

We started writing about the potential for significant volumes of gas for coal switching early last year. We then followed in Q2 2016 with a numerical analysis of potential switching volumes based on changes in gas and coal prices. By the end of 2016 the empirical evidence for switching was clear.

European gas fired generation output increased by more than 100TWh in 2016, relative to the previous year. This drove a 20 bcma increase in power sector gas demand. Higher gas plant load factors came largely at the expense of coal plant generation as the relative gas vs coal price balance shifted.

In today’s article we look at where switching took place in 2016. We also look at the impact of switching in:

  1. Driving the 2016 recovery in European gas demand
  2. Supporting gas hub prices and price volatility across 2016

 

Switching becomes a reality in 2016

Shifting relative fuel prices were the primary driving force behind power sector switching in 2016. European gas hub prices fell in Q1 and remained relatively weak through until Q4. Coal prices on the other hand commenced a sharp rally in Q1, roughly doubling by Q4.

Chart 1 gives a sense of the aggregate pan-European switching of gas for coal plant across 2016.

Chart 1: Aggregate change in European generation by fuel type (2016 v 2015)

Source: Sandbag/Agoda Energiewende

Chart 1 has been produced using data from a study conducted by Sandbag and Agora Energiewende. The data set covers estimated annual changes in generation output by fuel type and country in 2016 relative to 2015.

In Chart 2 we have used this data to generate a breakdown of estimated volumes of additional power sector gas burn.

Chart 2: Top 5 power markets driving 2016 gas demand recovery

Source: Timera Energy, Sandbag/Agoda Energiewende

The UK accounted for an estimated 43% of the 20 bcma of power sector demand recovery in 2016. This is principally a result of the UK carbon price floor (lifting generator carbon costs 18 £/t above the EU ETS price). The 2016 decline in gas prices relative to coal prices, in combination with the carbon price floor, crushed UK coal plant generation margins. Coal plants were driven out of merit and relegated to providing peaking backup, with CCGTs stepping in to fill the gap.

Germany was the second largest contributor. This was driven by the size of the German power market and the scale of switching potential given the dominance of thermal capacity. German spark spreads swung into positive territory over the summer as gas prices fell. They then remained supported over the second half of the year by surging coal prices.

The increase in power sector gas demand in France was more to do with the Q4 2016 nuclear outages than switching. Relatively low installed coal capacity in France limits switching potential. But CCGTs ran at relatively high load factors over the second half of the year to make up capacity shortfalls.

The Italian and Dutch markets were in fourth and fifth place, no surprise given the importance of CCGTs in the supply stack. Greece, Ireland and Portugal were the biggest contributors in the ‘Other EU 28’ category in the chart.

Switching is also supporting hub prices & volatility

European gas demand (including Turkey) recovered to 523 bcma in 2016. This is a 27 bcma (or 5.4%) increase from the 2015 level.

The power sector accounted for an estimated 20 bcma (74%) of that recovery, putting the importance of gas for coal switching in context. The French nuclear outages and cold weather in Q4 were the main drivers of the remainder of the recovery.

Switching was the transmission mechanism that allowed the 2016 coal price rally to feed through into gas prices. As coal prices rose, coal plant were displaced from power market merit orders to the benefit of CCGTs. The additional gas demand ensured gas hub prices ended 2016 substantially higher than they would have done if it had not been for the doubling of coal prices.

Another more subtle impact of the 2016 recovery in CCGT load factors is the associated support for spot gas price volatility. CCGTs are the transmission mechanism for the impact of intermittency from the power sector into gas market volatility. In other words, swings in generation output from intermittent renewable generation, translate into swings in CCGT load factors and hence fluctuations in power sector gas demand.

Chart 2 shows a pronounced recovery in UK spot gas price volatility in 2016. A similar trend can be observed across Europe’s other key hubs (e.g. TTF, NCG). Last year’s volatility recovery was helped by higher CCGT load factors causing higher gas demand and greater swing demand.

Chart 3: Evolution of UK spot price volatility (based on System Average Prices)

Source: Timera Energy

Switching sceptics may suggest that 2016 was an outlier year, a one off phenomena. We are not so sure. European coal prices remain elevated in Q1 2017. Gas hub prices recovered in Q4 2016 but downward pressure has returned in 2017 as the winter subsides, with Asian spot LNG prices re-converging with European hubs.

CCGTs have retained their advantage over coal in 2017 in the UK. The extent to which CCGTs displace coal plants on the Continent this year will come down to relative gas vs coal pricing, the barometer for European power sector switching.

Article written by David Stokes & Olly Spinks

US export flows, the supply glut and Europe

The Sabine Pass terminal exported its first cargo in Feb 2016.  This marked the start of a new era of US gas exports, an almost unthinkable development from a decade earlier when the US gas market was fighting to ramp up its imports of LNG.

While the commissioning of Sabine Pass was of symbolic importance, export volumes in 2016 were relatively small. Only 4.2 bcm [3 mt] of US LNG was exported last year, with capacity limited to Sabine Pass Trains 1 & 2.  Train 3 is currently being commissioned, with its first cargo dispatched recently.

A total of 89 bcm [65 mt] of committed new US export supply is due online by 2021, with the greatest volumes scheduled for 2018-19.  As US export volumes gain momentum they are set to transform LNG market flow patterns and pricing dynamics.

Where is US LNG flowing?

75 cargoes have been exported from Sabine Pass (up until the end of Feb 17).  Chart 1 shows a monthly breakdown of US originated cargoes by destination region.

Chart 1: US export flows by destination (vs regional price spreads)

Source: Timera Energy

Flow decisions for US export contracts are driven by netback global spot price signals.  These represent the market value for exported gas, adjusted for appropriate shipping and regas costs from the US.  To provide some guidance on regional price dynamics, we have overlaid the US vs Asian and US vs European spot price spreads on the chart.

A few observations on flows to date:

  • Cargo volumes by destination region were split as follows:
    • Latin America: 44%
    • Asia: 27%
    • Europe: 17%
    • Middle East: 12%
  • Latin America is a natural ‘first destination’ for US cargoes, as short shipping distances reduce netback costs. But Latin American demand is relatively low in a global context, so as US exports increase the Latin American share of cargoes will fall in proportion to other destinations (e.g. Europe).
  • The sharp jump in Asian spot prices in Dec saw an associated jump in US export volumes to Asia. Historically, Asia has pulled flexible cargoes from Europe in times of market tightness. Now the US is also contributing as a source of flexible supply.
  • Significant outages at Sabine Pass contributed to the dip in export volume in Oct-Nov 16.

While these observations provide an interesting first insight into US LNG flows, we suggest caution in extrapolating these conditions going forward.  As US export volumes grow over the next 2 to 3 years, destination and flow dynamics will likely alter significantly.

US exports and the European gas market

A relatively low volume of US exports have landed in Europe to date (17%).  But this belies the ‘behind the scenes’ role that Europe is playing in supporting the LNG market. US export volumes are being priced, optimised and hedged based on European hub price signals.

US cargo flow decisions are strongly influenced by NBP and TTF as liquid pricing benchmarks against which LNG portfolios are optimised, even though only a portion of cargoes actually land in Europe.  This dynamic is magnified by the fact that significant volumes of US export capacity are held by LNG aggregators who have flexible portfolios and a strong focus on portfolio optimisation.

Liquid North-West European gas hubs have been the key driver of regional LNG spot price signals since the gas glut started in earnest back in the summer of 2014.  There have been brief periods of regional price divergence from Europe (e.g. Dec 16 – Jan 17).  But the role of Europe as the market of last resort provides the benchmark from which regional spot prices are determined (e.g. in Asia and Latin America).

As well as playing an important pricing role, Europe is set to attract higher US cargo volumes as more export trains come online. After Latin America, Europe is the next cheapest destination for US exports from a shipping cost perspective.  As US export volumes grow, significant volumes are likely to land in Europe, or to displace cargoes that flow to Europe from elsewhere.  An increase in European cargo volumes can already be seen across the last 3 months in Chart 1.

Gas glut and the importance of Henry Hub

One of the most important implications of US export growth is the rising influence of the US Henry Hub price signal on global gas prices.  Henry Hub prices drive the variable cost base of existing US terminals.  They also determine the long run marginal cost (LRMC) competitiveness of new US export supply.

As new US export projects are commissioned and the LNG glut intensifies, European hub prices are likely to further converge with Henry Hub.  This should increase the importance of a converged trans-Atlantic hub price signal in setting regional LNG prices, with the US gas market providing global price support through the glut.

Some producers and analysts have recently suggested that the LNG supply glut may be ending. In our view, the numbers tell a different story, as we set out in our latest update pack on the LNG glut and asset value implications.

We are sticking to the thesis we set out last year: the LNG glut will remain the dominant driver of gas market dynamics for the next 3 – 5 years.  But market tightness may return with a vengeance next decade unless Financial Investment Decisions (FIDs) on new LNG supply are taken soon.

Article written by David Stokes and Olly Spinks

Contracting for market access via a 3rd party

A major transition is taking place with European energy asset ownership structures. Thermal power and midstream gas assets have traditionally been owned by utilities and producers. But asset write-downs, balance sheet pressure and changes in strategic focus are paving the way for large scale asset divestment.

Power plants, interconnectors, pipelines, gas storage facilities and midstream LNG assets are increasingly being sold to infrastructure and private equity investors, who are also funding the development of new flexible infrastructure projects. Most of the assets involved have significant associated market risk exposures which need to be optimised, dispatched and hedged in traded energy markets.

Some assets are being purchased with commercial functions already in place to manage market risk exposure. But in many cases, the trading & commercial capability and associated support functions remains with the utility or producer selling the asset. This is creating a growing requirement for investors to outsource commercial, trading and risk management services to 3rd party providers.

In today’s article we look at how investors are managing to access ‘route to market’ services via contracting with third parties.

Overview of market access structures

There is a spectrum of 3rd party market access structures. At one end are simple execution based agreements where the asset owner retains full commercial control of the asset, using a 3rd party trading desk as a market execution service. At the other end of the spectrum are complex contracts that effectively transfer the commercial management of an asset to a 3rd party in exchange for a fee. Most contracts currently being struck sit somewhere in the middle ground.

Two important factors determining the approach an asset buyer takes to negotiating a market access contract structure are:

  1. Risk/return profile: The extent to which the owner wants to be actively involved in management of asset risk & return.
  2. Commercial capability: The existing level of in-house commercial capability, or strategic ambition to develop this.

The common feature of all market access agreements is that the asset owner is contracting with a party that is active in the traded markets required to monetise the value of asset flexibility. This includes commercial & risk management expertise, counterparty and exchange agreements, analytics, systems and processes.

In order to understand how market access agreements are being structured, we have grouped contract structures into three approaches that sit at different points on the spectrum described above. These three groups are summarised in Table 1 and described below.

Table 1: Summary of types of market access agreement

Agreement Type Summary Pitfalls
Deal execution 3rd party provider transacts in market under direct instruction from owner
  • Structure of transaction fees
  • Credit risk & cost
Incentivised exposure transfer 3rd party provider incentivised to create value via actively managing asset exposures on behalf of owner, within defined constraints
  • Defining a clean asset exposure transfer mechanism
  • Alignment of incentives
  • Robust performance benchmark for trader value added
Value transfer 3rd party provider pays fee to asset owner in exchange for full control of margin & flexibility
  • Defining a fair benchmark for transfer of asset value (particularly extrinsic value)
  • Defining a clean separation of market exposures from other asset exposures (e.g. outage risk)

Source: Timera Energy

1. Deal execution

The simplest form of market access agreement is a deal execution service. The asset owner retains and manages all market risk exposure and control of hedging and optimisation of asset(s). The asset owner effectively pays the 3rd party trading desk to transact in the market on their behalf, rather than transacting directly in the external market.

The reason for contracting a deal execution service is that it means asset owners can avoid the overheads of establishing multiple counterparty trading relationships e.g. the setup costs of master agreements, credit lines, complex trading & risk management systems and 24/7 commercial operations. 3rd party deal execution can also mean access to better market prices i.e. lower bid/offer spreads.

The asset owner typically pays a fee, usually in the form of a variable charge for each transaction. This covers external market costs (e.g. bid / offer spreads) and risks (mainly a credit risk charge). An allocation for trading overheads may be covered via a fixed fee (e.g. monthly) or via a surcharge on the variable fees.

Deal execution agreements are typically signed by asset owners with a strong in-house commercial capability, but who lack an established presence and access to information in specific traded markets, or lack the required physical capabilities and licences. For example a US or Asian fund may have strong commercial capabilities in their domestic markets but not in Europe. Or alternatively a generator may have a short term asset dispatch capability but lack access to forward markets.

From an asset owner’s perspective the key areas to watch out for with deal execution agreements are:

  • The level and mechanism of transaction fees, which can result in ‘death by a thousand cuts’ via transaction fees eroding value if they are not properly structured.
  • The extent of the 3rd party contractor’s access to counterparties and market liquidity, as well as an assessment of their overall market & commercial expertise. This includes how the costs and risks associated with periods of market illiquidity are dealt with.
  • The credit risk of the 3rd party.

The good news is there is growing competition to provide deal execution services in Europe amongst banks, commodity traders and larger utility/producer energy trading desks. This is helped by the fact that traders typically like providing execution services (for the right fee), because they generate a regular deal flow (i.e. provide liquidity).

2. Incentivised exposure management

The most common form of market access contracts currently being negotiated by asset investors, involves the transfer of asset exposures from owner to 3rd party provider, along with incentives to monetise asset value. If a contract is structured well, it allows the asset owner to retain a degree of control over managing asset risk/return. But it also allows for the 3rd party provider to add value through its trading expertise.

CCGT ‘exposure transfer’ case study

Consider a simple case study involving a CCGT power asset. The asset owner may want to retain control over hedging of asset margins in the forward market. For example the timing and volume decisions on hedging of forward spark spreads may be made by the owner, even if individual trades are executed via the 3rd party provider.

But the owner may want to transfer plant exposures to the 3rd party provider prior to the day-ahead stage. This allows the owner to avoid the overheads and complexities required to deal with factors such as hourly auctions, nominations, plant dispatch and balancing.

Exposure transfer is typically achieved by agreeing a benchmark for optimised asset value at the point of handover (e.g. day-ahead). Once asset exposures have been transferred, incentivisation mechanisms can be used to align the interests of owner and 3rd party trader in managing asset risk/return into delivery.

In the situation described above, the value added by the 3rd party is focused on managing power plant exposures in the prompt forward and real time markets. Significant incremental value can be generated over this shorter term horizon, given ability to optimise CCGT flexibility against price shape and volatility.

 

This type of market access agreement is a structure that allows the 3rd party provider to maximise the value of asset exposures within the incentives and constraints imposed by the agreement. In return the provider receives compensation for this service based on a portion of the value delivered.

The key to structuring a successful agreement of this type is defining:

  1. A fair & transparent benchmark for incremental value added by the trading desk (vs the inherent value of asset flexibility which should accrue to the owner)
  2. An appropriate incentivisation mechanism that aligns party interests and allows a fair sharing of realised value

The asset owner may also choose to handover a greater degree of control for asset margin management to the 3rd party provider. This is typically achieved via adopting more of an ‘open book’ approach to asset value management as set out in the case study below.

Gas pipeline ‘open book’ case study

Consider another simple example involving a European gas pipeline asset, where margin is managed via a combination of long term and shorter term contract sales.

In this situation the asset owner may want to retain control over the sale of long term contracts (typically large and infrequent). But the owner may have an agreement with a 3rd party service provider to manage the day to day sale of shorter term firm and interruptible capacity products.

Under this type of structure, the 3rd party has a greater degree of responsibility for monetising asset value, given a broader commercial freedom to market capacity not already sold via long term contract.   But value management is done within a governance framework controlled by the asset owner. This allows the owner to have a relatively small commercial team to support the asset (e.g. 2 or 3 people), something which is often an advantage for a fund with multiple investments.

The asset owner is typically looking for commercial creativity and an ability to access sources of value are difficult for the owner to achieve (e.g. given a lack of critical mass). But the asset owner can be faced with the issue of conflict of interests, if the 3rd party has a portfolio of its own assets in the same class, as is often the case.

This type of agreement is typically structured around an ‘open book’ approach, where both parties have full transparency of deals being made.   However for this structure to work, a clear set of constraints (e.g. risk/return boundaries), incentives (e.g. aligned value sharing) and performance benchmarks are critical.   It can also create a significant overhead for reporting & auditing of P&L and commercial decisions for both parties.

 

3. Value transfer

The third grouping of market access agreements involves a more structural transfer of asset value management to a 3rd party provider. This is typically done via some form of exposure transfer pricing structure. The 3rd party provider pays the asset owner for what is usually full control of asset margin and flexibility. In exchange for this payment, the 3rd party has access to 100% of asset value generated. In other words its profit and loss is the difference between realised asset margin and the transfer pricing payment.

The most common type of deal here is a tolling contract. The asset owner receives a capacity fee, for transferring asset management and margin via contract to a 3rd party. Examples include the tolling of thermal power plant capacity, oil refinery capacity and the sale of US LNG export capacity. The tolling fee is typically fixed but can also be indexed to market price benchmarks or even volatility.

But more flexible structures are also used. Utilities and producers commonly use a ‘rolling transfer’ mechanism to pass asset exposures from the ‘asset owner’ business unit to the ‘trading’ business unit. Exposures are typically transferred over a rolling forward curve horizon, based on prevailing market conditions at the time. For example, transfer of asset exposures from a CCGT priced at prevailing spark spread.

The toughest challenge in structuring deals in this group is typically associated with defining a fair value for transferring asset exposures. The intrinsic or hedgeable component of value can be benchmarked against forward market prices. But defining a robust mechanism for pricing and transferring the extrinsic (or flexibility) value of an asset is complex.

There is often an asymmetry of information here. The 3rd party trader typically has strong commercial expertise and market knowledge that supports definition of asset value. The asset owner on the other hand is often a step removed from this detailed expertise.

Structuring market access contracts

The growth in 3rd party market access services in Europe is being driven by an increasing business model separation of asset ownership from trading expertise. As a results, market access services and contract structures have matured significantly over the last two or three years.

However the degree to which market access contracts are standardised will always be limited by the unique characteristics of individual assets and owner requirements. The approach taken on fee structures, pricing mechanisms, exposure transfer, incentivisation and performance benchmarking, define the difference between a deal that adds or erodes asset value.

We return shortly with a follow up article to set out our experience of the 5 key success factors underpinning a robust market access deal.

Article written by Olly Spinks, David Stokes and Nick Perry

Relative pricing dynamics driving European gas hubs

A number of interesting dynamics have emerged in the European gas market over the last twelve months.

On the supply side, relatively low LNG import volumes have been offset by higher Russian flow volumes. This has been pitched as round one in a multi-year Russian vs LNG import battle for European market share.

On the demand side, European gas consumption recovered in 2016, driven by a sharp increase in power sector gas demand and the onset of a cold winter.

It may be tempting to try understand the drivers of each of these developments in relative isolation. But the events of the last year can to a large extent be explained by the evolution of market pricing dynamics.

Last week we explored the relationship between European hub and spot LNG prices. In today’s article we look at the key relationships between:

  1. European gas and oil prices, driving long term gas contract flow volumes
  2. European gas and coal prices, impacting power sector gas demand

These three relationships are key indicators on our European gas market ‘dashboard’. They provide an insight into both the historical evolution of market conditions as well as guidance on the future direction of flows and pricing.

Revisiting the key price benchmarks that drive European hubs

Chart 1 summarises the evolution of hub prices in the context of the last 10 years of history, as well as providing a current snapshot of forward market pricing.

Chart 1: Evolution of key gas price benchmarks

Source: Timera Energy

Chart 2 then shows a blown up view of recent history and forward market benchmarks over the next 12 months.

Chart 2: Blown up view of gas price benchmarks

Source: Timera Energy

Some important observations from Chart 2:

  • Q1 slump: European hub prices, Asian spot LNG and Russian oil-index contract prices all fell sharply in Q1 2016 towards 4 $/mmbtu. This happened in parallel to a global commodity price slump.
  • Oil & coal recovery: Oil and coal prices commenced a pronounced recovery in Q2 that carried through to Q4, with the prices of both commodities roughly doubling from their lowest levels. Coal prices played a key role in influencing European hub prices in late 2016 as we discuss below.
  • LT contract prices: The prices of long term oil-indexed supply contracts remained relatively weak across 2016, driven by the 6-9 month time lag in indexation to crude prices.
  • Q4 rally: Hub prices rallied sharply in Q4 back to 6 $/mmbtu, alongside rising Asian spot LNG prices as the winter set in. This opened up a significant premium of hub prices over oil-indexed contract prices.

We now map these pricing dynamics on to some of the key supply and demand events on 2016.

Is Russia making a grab for market share?

European import volumes from Russia were strong in 2016, at 179 bcm (an approximately 34% market share). This can be compared to a recent historical average closer to 150 bcma.

LNG imports on the other hand were lower than expected, despite the commissioning of significant volumes of new global liquefaction capacity. In January we summarised the outage issues and liquefaction ramping delays that have somewhat curtailed volumes of new LNG supply.

As a result of robust export volumes, Gazprom has been quick to claim round one in its fight for market share against LNG. But the reality is a more complex function of exercise decisions on long term contract volumes.

The flow decisions on the large majority of Russian gas imports, sits with suppliers via long term contract exercise rights. The big boost in Russian import volumes in 2016 came in Q4. Chart 2 illustrates why suppliers nominated high volumes in Q4, given the substantial discount of oil-indexed contract prices relative to hub price alternatives. At the same time, stronger Asian demand was causing LNG cargoes to be diverted away from Europe.

Gazprom may be becoming more assertive in its attempts to grow European market share. But its ability to do this in 2016 had a lot to do with the evolution of hub prices relative to oil and Asian LNG prices. Those tailwinds look to be weakening in 2017.

Gas vs coal switching becomes a reality

A cold start to the current winter helped to support gas demand in Q4 2016. But the primary driver of a recovery in European gas demand relative to 2015 was a sharp increase in power sector gas demand.

Gas demand from European power plants rose by approximately 20 bcm relative to 2015, as CCGTs ran at higher load factors. The key driver of higher gas plant burn was a shift in relative gas vs coal prices.

As 2016 progressed, coal prices surged relative to European gas prices. This meant that CCGTs were more competitive on a variable cost basis, supporting run hours. The coal price surge played an important and underappreciated role in supporting European hub prices in 2016.

Coal prices roughly doubled between Q1 and Q4 2016. This significantly lifted the switching boundaries at which CCGTs displaced coal plants, particularly in UK power market with its carbon price floor. In other words the rise in coal plant variable costs meant that price support from the power sector materialised at higher gas price levels.

Power sector gas demand was particularly strong in Q4 2016, as coal prices surged towards 100 $/t and French nuclear outages were backfilled by CCGTs. This also contributed to the Q4 rally in hub prices that can been seen in Chart 1.

 Looking forward into 2017

European hub prices have remained supported into Q1 2017 by ongoing cold weather and relatively low storage inventories. But prices have started to decline in February as regional LNG spot prices have re-converged with North-West European hubs. There looks to be an associated increase in LNG cargoes heading for Europe.

The big rally in oil prices in the second half of 2016 is starting to feed through long term contract price index lags. The effect of this can be seen in Chart 2, with the Russian oil-indexed contract price benchmark rising sharply in Q1 2017.

However current forward market prices suggests that hub gas will once again become cheaper than oil-indexed contracts in Q2. So Russian import volumes are likely to be robust in Q1 2017, but relative pricing dynamics may shift against Russian gas flows as the year progresses. The spread of Asian spot LNG prices over European hubs will also be an important factor to watch as an indication of LNG market tightness.

The key gas demand question for 2017 is to what extent power sector consumption continues to recover. The barometer for further gas for coal switching in 2017 is the relative levels of gas versus coal prices. European coal prices have fallen back from their peak in Q4 2016, but remain elevated (API2 currently around 77 $/t). The extent to which gas hub prices fall into the summer will be an important driver of the relative competitiveness of CCGTs.

We will keep an eye on the key relative price relationships covered in this article as the year progresses.

Article written by David Stokes, Olly Spinks & Howard Rogers

Winter LNG spot price volatility

Global LNG spot prices have been relatively subdued over the past two winters.  Increases in global liquefaction capacity and weaker demand have kept regional LNG prices within a relatively tight range of European hub price support.

But LNG spot price volatility is back this winter.  Asian spot prices surged from just above 7 $/mmbtu at the start of December towards 10 $/mmbtu in early January.  This opened up a significant premium over North-West European hub prices, signalling Asia’s requirement for incremental cargoes.

Early January then saw Southern European spot prices trumping Asia as a cold snap hit the Mediterranean. Pipeline bottlenecks within France caused a sharp price separation between Northern European hubs and their LNG dependent Southern neighbours.

The events of Winter 2016-17 make an interesting case study of how spot price volatility can temporarily disrupt structural global price convergence, despite prevailing supply glut conditions.

Asian LNG premium makes a comeback

European hub prices have been the primary driver of spot LNG prices since the global supply glut took hold in Summer 2014.  This is because North-West European hubs represent a liquid backstop in an oversupplied LNG market.  If regional spot prices start to diverge from European hub prices, flexible LNG is diverted away from Europe to higher priced markets, checking the extent of regional price separation.

However the ‘gravitational’ effect of European hubs can break down over a shorter term horizon.  This is because volumes of flexible LNG still make up a relatively small portion of the total market.  LNG supply chain lead times also create practical constraints in moving gas between regions.

As a result of these factors, short term supply can be relatively unresponsive to spot prices (i.e. inelastic).  The events of the current winter illustrate this dynamic.

Asian spot prices entered this winter at a relatively narrow premium to North-West European hub prices (~ 1 $/mmbtu).  Over the first two weeks of December, a surge in Asian spot prices saw this premium quickly rise towards 4 $/mmbtu.

Chart 1 shows the evolution of prices in Asia versus European hubs in Q4 2016, relative to recent history.  We have used Singapore Exchange (SGX) spot price data to show Asian spot LNG benchmarks (the Singapore and North Asia indices).

Chart 1: Asian spot vs European hub prices

Source: Timera Energy (data from LEBA/SGX)

Several factors contributed to the sudden tightening in Asia in Q4.  On the supply side, the large Western Australian Gorgon project announced an outage at the end of November, compounding supply reductions from outages at an APLNG train in Queensland and the terminal in Angola.

At the same time, Asian demand for spot cargoes increased.  South Korea faced several nuclear outages requiring LNG backup and Chinese demand was strong as the winter took hold.  This surge in demand was suddenly pushing up a steep and contracting supply curve.

Southern Europe prices up to Asia

Gas flows within France are constrained by a North-South pipeline bottleneck as we have described previously.  This can leave the TRS hub (an amalgamation of the former PEG Sud & TIGF hubs) in Southern France dependent on LNG imports to the Fos terminals on the Mediterranean coast in periods of higher winter demand.

Just as Asia sent a strong spot price signal to Europe to divert flexible LNG cargoes, Southern Europe had its own supply crunch.  A cold snap hit Mediterranean Europe in early January with gas demand surging.  This led to a shortage of cargoes available for Mediterranean delivery, exacerbated by an Algerian liquefaction terminal maintenance outage.

Relatively small price increases are typically required for Southern France to attract cargoes from other Mediterranean terminals e.g. in Spain. But a more widespread LNG shortfall in January saw Southern European spot price benchmarks surge through 10 $/mmbtu to open up a premium to Asia as can be seen in Chart 1.

Price separation of this magnitude between Northern and Southern Europe is typically a short lived phenomena.  TRS prices can be seen re-converging with by late January as LNG imports returned. The key North-South pipeline bottleneck is also in the process of being alleviated with new pipeline capacity due to come online for winter 2018-19.

How is this volatility possible with a supply glut?

Price spikes and Asian spot premiums appear to be strange conditions for a structurally oversupplied global market.  Are they evidence of a premature end to the global supply glut? And is global price convergence an over-hyped phenomena?  Not in our view.

Spot prices re-converged with European hub prices in late January just as fast as they rose in early December.  As a result, the premium of Asian spot prices over North-West Europe has fallen back to less than 1 $/mmbtu, signalling a return of surplus cargoes into Europe.  The primary drivers of this ‘return to normal’ are:

  1. Winter demand surges reverting to normal
  2. Liquefaction capacity returning from outages
  3. LNG supply chain response to spot price signals

In other words the spot price volatility observed over December and January is a function of short term dislocations in supply and demand, and the supply chain response time required to rectify these.

Volatility events such as those observed over the current winter become less common in an oversupplied global gas market.  But this sort of shorter term price volatility is inherent to the LNG market.  The appearance of shorter term bouts of regional price volatility does not challenge the prevailing conditions of structural oversupply and price convergence between Asia and Europe.

We return next week to take a closer look at European gas market dynamics, Russian market share and gas coal switching.

Article written by Olly Spinks & David Stokes

UK power: will next winter be a repeat of this one?

The UK power market entered this winter with the tightest system reserve margin since market liberalisation in the 1990s. The reserve margin has fallen sharply over the last five years as older gas and coal plants have retired.  The closure of three large coal plants in the first half of 2016 set up particularly tight conditions for the current winter.

Symptoms of market tightness over the last three winters have been disguised by relatively mild & windy weather. High volumes of lower cost imports from the Continent have also helped to dampen volatility.  But Q4 2016 saw UK power prices and generation margins explode higher as system stress set in.

After spending most of the last five years in a relatively tight 0 to 5 £/MWh range, gas plant generation margins spiked towards 30 £/MWh in Q4 2016.  Chart 1 shows the scale of the Q4 jump in Clean Spark Spreads (CSS) relative to the rest of this decade.

Chart 1: UK Baseload Clean Spark Spreads (CSS) and Clean Dark Spreads (CDS)

Source: Timera Energy

The French nuclear outages we looked at last week were a big factor behind the UK’s Q4 price spike, as the two markets fought for available electricity across the interconnector.  But more normal conditions have returned in Q1 2017 as French nukes have come back online.

Generation margins in the forward market for Winter 2017-18 have also returned to more subdued levels, as shown in Chart 1.  This relates in part to the calming influence of the extra auction (EA) for capacity in 2017-18 that cleared on February 3rd.  In today’s article we look at the results of this EA auction and consider how UK price dynamics next winter may compare to the conditions experienced this winter.

As we have pointed out a number of times before, forward curves are not forecasts of spot price evolution.  The downward slope of forward CSS prices is primarly driven by contango in the gas curve.  There is also very limited liquidity beyond the front three seasons in the UK power market, meaning published forward prices have little relevance beyond 2018.  To better understand how spot price evolution may diverge from forward pricing, it is important to dig into supply, demand and marginal price setting dynamics in the UK power market.

EA auction

The extra 2017-18 capacity auction was implemented by the UK government in 2016 in response to widespread criticism of the Supplemental Balancing Response (SBR) mechanism, used to procure emergency reserve capacity over the last three winters.  The EA auction allowed the government to directly influence the system capacity level from Oct 2017, helping to alleviate concerns around security of supply.

The lower EA auction clearing price (6.95 £/kW) was primarily a function of a surplus of 3.6GW of existing capacity over the government’s demand target.  57.2 GW of existing capacity prequalified for the auction (including the already commissioned Carrington CCGT which is categorised as new capacity) versus the 53.6 GW target.

You could be forgiven for thinking it sounds strange that a market as tight as the UK can have such a surplus of existing capacity.  Chart 2 sheds some light on how this is possible, at least in a capacity accounting sense.

Chart 2: Summary of EA auction volumes

Source: Timera Energy, Grid provisional auction results

The key numbers from the auction results that are shown in Chart 2 are as follows:

  • Cleared capacity: Of the 59.3 GW of prequalified capacity, 54.4 GW of capacity cleared the auction (above the government’s 53.6 GW demand target, given a downward sloping demand curve and lower clearing price).
  • Cleared new capacity: 1 GW of new capacity was successful (0.9 GW of new generation, 0.2 GW of new DSR), effectively adding to the surplus of existing capacity. This capacity predominantly came from the accelerated delivery of small scale peaker projects successful in previous T-4 auctions. Note the 0.8GW Carrington CCGT is also technically classified as new capacity, but we have excluded this given it is already operational.
  • Exited existing capacity: 9 GW of existing capacity did not clear the auction. The key thermal units that failed to clear were Barking (already mothballed), Deeside CCGT, 1 unit of Fiddlers Ferry coal station, Peterhead CCGT, 2 units of Ratcliffe coal station and the remaining units of Uskmouth coal station.

The two main surprises from the auction were:

  • The Eggborough coal plant (1.8GW derated) cleared the auction, helping to push down the auction price.
  • Ratcliffe Units 1 & 3 (448 MW each) exited the auction despite these units having T-4 agreements for 2018-21.

It is reasonable to assume that up to 2.4GW of existing capacity that was unsuccessful in the auction will close or be unavailable to provide capacity next winter. This excludes the two Ratcliffe units, given the status of these next winter is not yet clear.

Market dynamics in Winter 2016 vs Winter 2017

The tight UK capacity balance this winter has clearly resulted in higher power prices and generation margins (as shown in Chart 1).  So let’s consider how this capacity balance is likely to change by next winter:

The following is an estimated breakdown of the main incremental changes that may occur:

  • SBR: 3.5 GW (derated) of ‘emergency response’ SBR capacity comes back into normal supply stack as the SBR mechanism is discontinued.
    Withdrawals: An estimated 2.4 GW (derated) capacity closes during 2017 or is unavailable to provide capacity next winter (after exiting the EA auction).  This could be less if some of these units remain online despite not receiving capacity payments.
  • New build: 1.1 GW (derated) of new, predominantly peaking, capacity is built by Oct 17.
  • Renewables: ~1.5 GW (nameplate) of new renewables capacity comes online, predominantly intermittent wind.

In a capacity accounting sense those changes result in a system reserve margin that National Grid estimates is consistent with the UK government’s security of supply standard (3 hour LOLE).  But underneath the headline capacity level, there are some important changes in supply stack dynamics.

In isolation, the return of 3.5GW of SBR capacity back into the supply stack should definitely have a price and volatility dampening effect.  This is because this capacity will return to operating on a short run marginal cost basis.  The effective variable cost of dispatching SBR capacity across Winter 2016-17 has been very high given the ‘emergency response’ guidelines.

The ‘SBR return’ benefit may be significantly offset by the removal of up to 2.4GW of capacity from the supply stack.  Replacement capacity comes mainly in the form of new peakers and wind capacity.  But the peakers have high effective variable dispatch costs (e.g. 150-250 £/MWh) compared to the larger coal and CCGT units that are closing.  And new wind capacity is intermittent versus the flexible capacity it is replacing.

There is also a thorny question as to whether the government’s assumed capacity contribution from interconnectors is still appropriate after issues with flows from France over the current winter (see our article last week).

So in summary, the system reserve buffer may have improved versus last winter in a capacity accounting sense. But the UK market will be more dependent on intermittent renewable capacity and higher variable cost peakers by next winter.  These factors are likely to continue to support CCGT generation margins and power price volatility until new CCGT capacity is built next decade.

Article written by David Stokes & Olly Spinks

Interconnector value & the cross-channel tug of war

It has been an explosive winter in North West European power markets.  Elevated prices, spikes and volatility have suddenly returned, in stark contrast to the relatively stable conditions that have become the norm over most of this decade.

System stress has been highest in the French and UK power markets. Extended outages at nuclear plants in France decimated the system reserve margin, leaving the French market dependent on imports in periods of high demand.  Across the English Channel, the UK power market is also confronting its tightest winter in history.

These conditions mean the IFA interconnector between the UK and France (2GW) has become a battle ground for available electricity.  This has been reflected in a surge in volatility of the spread between UK and French power prices.  The strong structural flow pattern from France to the UK has been temporarily replaced with a complex pattern of fluctuating flows and intra-day reversals.  Today we look at the implications for interconnector capacity value.

How to think about interconnector capacity value

Cross border transmission capacity deconstructs into a locational spread option.  In other words it provides the capacity holder with the right but not obligation to flow power between two countries.

Power is flowed to realise a positive margin, if the price in Market A exceeds the price in Market B, allowing for any variable costs of flow (and vice versa).  A simple payoff function is summarised in Diagram 1 below.

Diagram 1: Interconnector capacity payoff function

Capacity pay-off

There are two key drivers of capacity value:

  1. The level of the price spread between the two markets, which drives the intrinsic value of capacity.
  2. The behaviour of price spread movement over time characterised by the volatility and correlation of power prices, key drivers of extrinsic value that can be realised from adjusting flows in response to fluctuations in the price spread.

These drivers have undergone a transformational change coming into the current winter.

 UK vs French spread and flow dynamics

The last five years have seen relatively stable price spread conditions, with UK prices at a structural premium to France.  There have been two primary drivers of this structural spread:

  1. Power prices in France (and across NW Europe) have been predominantly influenced by coal unit variable costs, which have been structurally cheaper than CCGT variable costs which set UK power prices.
  2. The UK carbon price floor (18 £/t above the EU ETS price) reinforces the generation cost premium of the UK over France.

These factors continue to support a strong structural premium of UK over French power prices in the forward market.  The Calendar 2018 UK power price is currently trading at around a 15 €/MWh premium to France, similar to its pre-winter level.  But this structural forward spread dynamics has been disrupted in the spot market across the current winter as illustrated in Chart 1.

Chart 1: Average daily FR/UK spread and I/C flows (2016)

FR UK IC daily

Source: Timera Energy

Chart 1 shows UK imports as positive flows (the grey line above the horizontal axis).  The red line shows the UK vs FR power price spread, which is positive when UK prices are at a premium to France (and vice versa).

Several observations on the Chart:

  1. The strong structural UK vs FR price spread and associated flow pattern is evident from Jan until Aug
  2. A rapid transformation in spread and flows took place from September as the impact of French nuclear outages started to drive a substantial scarcity premium into French power prices (eroding the spread)
  3. The volatility of the price spread and fluctuations of flows has surged since the start of winter, reflecting a cross channel ‘tug o war’ as both the French and UK systems fight for available electricity

The dynamic behaviour of cross-channel spreads and flows is even clearer when viewed at an hourly level in Chart 2.

Chart 2: Hourly UK vs FR price spread and IFA flows (7 days from 8th Dec 16)

FR UK IC hourly

Source: Timera Energy

Chart 2 shows how cleanly participants can dispatch interconnector capacity against spot price signals using harmonised day-ahead auctions.  This can be seen via the very strong relationship between the direction of price spreads and flows.  This shows that capacity utilisation and dispatch is operating efficiently, as are the workings of the UK and French power markets in providing liquidity on each side of the interconnector.

Implications for asset owners and investors

Asset owners and investors love intrinsic value driven by structural price spreads. A high proportion of intrinsic value can be realised when selling capacity to market counterparties.  This is because capacity buyers can hedge intrinsic value with relatively low cost & risk, and easily mark it to market.

But extrinsic value dynamics also play a key role in driving interconnector capacity value.  This is particularly the case during periods of lower price spreads or higher spread volatility.  Chart 2 illustrates how liquid hourly spot markets facilitate capacity buyers to precisely nominate flows to capture margin from cross border price spread volatility.

There are several important characteristics of intrinsic and extrinsic value that impact the risk and return on interconnector capacity:

  1. Structural spreads: Intrinsic value dominates interconnector margin during times of strong structural price spreads. Intrinsic margin is important in supporting the sale of capacity contracts, particularly long term contracts to facilitate debt financing.
  2. Bi-directional flows: The bi-directional nature of interconnector flows means that value loss in one direction is typically replaced by value gain in the other. In other words it is the absolute level of the price spread that drives intrinsic value, rather than whether the spread is positive or negative.
  3. Extrinsic value offset: During periods where price spreads decline (i.e. when the spread option moves ‘close to the money’), extrinsic value increases significantly (e.g. across the current winter). Increasing extrinsic value partially offsets the decline in intrinsic value.  This inverse relationship provides important downside margin protection.
  4. Extrinsic value capture: There is a higher cost and risk in monetising the extrinsic value of capacity (relative to intrinsic value), given it requires a more complex and higher volume prompt trading strategy. This is reflected in deeper price haircuts when selling capacity contracts.

Robust valuation of interconnector assets can be challenging.  Spread optionality is complex and there are practical challenges in monetising capacity, whether via selling long term contracts or via shorter term capacity sales. But accurately capturing the dynamics of intrinsic and extrinsic value set out above is a good starting point for developing an accurate quantification of asset risk/return.

Article written by Olly Spinks & David Stokes

5 surprises for 2017

Our list of surprises for 2016 focused on changing energy market price dynamics. In Q1 2016, cyclically depressed conditions in a number of markets suggested the risk of major changes in energy pricing trends as the year progressed. We focused on oil, German power, European spark spreads and trans-Atlantic LNG price spreads (see here for an end of year status update on these surprises).

Cyclical extremes and pricing inflection points are particularly interesting because they often coincide with extremes in the mispricing of asset values and asset risks. Many energy markets look to have formed multi-year cyclical lows in Q1/Q2 2016. But prices recovered sharply in the second half of the year, returning markets to a more balanced state.

So this year we cast the net a little wider. Coming into 2017, surprise risk looks to be skewed more towards political and policy shifts.

The 2017 landscape

An important transition appears to be underway globally. Austerity and monetary easing have been two of the dominant economic policy response mechanisms since the financial crisis. But support for these mechanisms appears to be weakening, particularly given a rise in populist politics.

There appears to be a policy shift underway towards national self-interest and higher fiscal spending to reflate economic growth. This is most obvious in the US under Trump, but is becoming a more prominent trend in European countries also. The success, or otherwise, of this policy transition will have an important impact on economic growth, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices, all of which are important macro drivers of energy markets.

Against this backdrop we set out 5 potential surprises to consider below. The first surprise considers some larger ‘macro’ risks that could have an important knock-on impact on energy markets. Then the next four are specific surprises that relate to European power and gas markets.

1. Macro shock(s)

There were a number of big political shocks in 2016: Brexit, Trump’s election victory and the Italian referendum and resignation of Renzi. All of these represented a rapidly rising discomfort with incumbent political leadership and a shift towards new populist candidates. The impact of these shocks has only just started to play out.

Political uncertainty remains unusually high in 2017 with key elections in France, Germany, Netherlands and Italy. A populist shift in any of these countries has the potential to reshape the European political landscape. This could also result in a sharp weakening in the Euro.

The other important transition that appears to be taking place in a number of key economies, is a return to a rising inflation and rising interest rate environment for the first time since 2008. Inflation in several European countries has picked up over the last few months, albeit from very low levels. German inflation may breach the 2% ECB target range this month, driven by rising energy prices. UK inflation is also rising towards 2%, helped by a weaker pound. 2017 could see an upside surprise for both inflation and interest rates, both of which may be commencing a long term recovery from historically low levels.

2. LNG Asian demand pickup

Annual Asian LNG demand fell in 2015 for the first time ever, despite rapidly declining LNG prices. This sent shockwaves through the LNG industry which was banking on robust Asian demand growth to absorb the output from huge investments in new liquefaction capacity.

2016 saw a significant recovery in annual Asian LNG demand as shown in Chart 1. Increasing demand was driven by China, India and Pakistan, offsetting a further decline in Japanese demand. However, even at the end of 2016, total Asian LNG demand remains below the 2014 level.

Chart 1: Annual Asian LNG demand (2016 vs 2015)

Asian LNG demand change

Source: Timera Energy

As 2016 progressed, the price of alternative fuels (e.g. coal and oil) increased relative to LNG. This may provide momentum in 2017 for both:

  1. an increase in opportunistic purchasing of spot cargoes
  2. signing of new contract volumes on a medium to longer term basis (supported by more attractive deal terms)

These factors could mean Asian LNG demand growth in 2017 surprises to the upside. But even aggressive Asian demand growth recovery is unlikely to reverse the looming supply glut, given the scale of new supply coming online by 2020. It may however mean that Asia plays a more important role in absorbing that glut.

3. European power & gas M&A growth

Conditions that support growth in mergers & acquisition (M&A) in European power and gas markets have been building for several years. On the sell side, utilities and producers have written down more than €100 bn in asset values since 2010. Tens of billions of euros of European power and gas assets have been earmarked for sale to shore up balance sheets.

Infrastructure and private equity funds dominate the buy side, alongside interest from some large Asian investors. Power and gas infrastructure is an increasingly attractive acquisition target for these investors. Cash balances are relatively high and financing flexibility has improved. European currency depreciation against the dollar is also helping, particularly a more than 20% post-Brexit fall in GBP (vs the USD). After much anticipation over the last two to three years, 2017 may be the year that transaction volumes really jump, causing some major restructuring of European asset ownership.

4. Capacity support becomes a reality on the Continent

The UK government has been focused on power market security of supply for the last five years. But direct action on security of supply has been a lower priority in Continental power markets. Different capacity support mechanisms are being designed and discussed, but aside from France who introduced a new capacity market in 2016, implementation has been slow given a perceived structural oversupply of capacity.

Capacity tightness has come racing back into focus across the current winter. Capacity shortfalls in France relating to nuclear outages have sent power prices into triple figures (> 100 €/MWh). Increasing interconnection and renewables penetration are supporting a knock on effect in neighbouring markets. Periods of high net system demand have seen markets such as France, the UK and Belgium fighting for access to flexible generation output.

The events of this winter are likely to drive an increased policy focus on support measures for flexible generation capacity. 2017 may be the year that planning and talking about capacity support are replaced by a leap toward implementation.

5. Jump in value of European gas supply flexibility

A recovery in supply flexibility value is partly a cyclical story. Price signals have been weak for 6 or 7 years, choking off investment in new flexible supply infrastructure and causing the closure of some existing assets.

Spot gas price volatility levels above 150% were commonplace last decade. But spot volatility at European gas hubs has hovered around 50% for most of this decade. Volatility started to recover in 2016 and could accelerate further in 2017.

There are several specific issues that could bite this year. As European LNG imports increase this year with global supply volumes, hub prices may be buffeted by the ebb and flow of chunky cargo volumes, increasing the requirement for supply flexibility.

A cloud also remains over two of Europe’s key flexible supply assets. Further reductions in flexibility from the UK’s Rough storage facility or the Dutch Groningen field may help support the value of supply flexibility.

Scenario application

The scenarios above draw on a number of themes that we have written about previously:

  • The key role of Asian LNG demand in a world of oversupply
  • Growing momentum behind European gas and power asset transactions
  • The widespread role out of capacity payments for flexible power assets
  • Depressed values of flexible European gas supply infrastructure
  • The potential for external macro shocks to impact energy markets

The aim of these surprises is not to deliver specific trade or investment ideas, although they hopefully provide some food for thought. Instead the surprises are intended to provide a reasonable challenge to prevailing industry consensus views. They are areas to consider when formulating commercial and risk management strategies in 2017.

We will return again at the end of the year for a status check.

Article written by David Stokes & Olly Spinks